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INTRODUCTION 
The Indian Child Welfare Act is referred to in this 
reply brief as the "ICWA". The legislative history of the Act is 
referred to as the "House Report" for H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th 
Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted at 1978 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
7530, and the "BIA Guidelines" for "Part III, Department of the 
Interior; Bureau of Indian Affairs; Guidelines for State Courts; 
Indian Child Custody Proceedings", 44 Fed. Reg. 67584 (Nov. 26, 
1979) . 
The transcript of the hearing of April 7, 1983, is 
referred to as Transcript I. The transcript of the hearing of 
October 22, 1984, is referred to as Transcript II. The consent 
proceeding of May 30, 1980, is attached to this brief as Exhibit 
K. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents1 Statement of Facts is virtually identical 
to the Summary of Facts attached as an exhibit to Respondents' 
brief. As alleged in Appellants1 recent Motion to Strike, 
Respondents have deliberately distorted some of the relevant 
testimony. The Court is urged to read the actual testimony 
rather than to rely on the summary prepared by Respondents. 
Two examples are given to illustrate the nature of this 
problem. On page 3, line 14, Respondents allege that the natural 
mother testified that there were times when Jeremiah was found 
unattended because the grandmother was drunk. This is false. 
The only person who testified to this was Respondents' attorney. 
1 
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Twice he tried to put testimony into the mouth of the Navajo 
Nation witnesses. In both cases, he was expressly corrected, by 
the natural mother (Transcript I, p.23, line 24) and the tribe's 
social worker (Transcript I, p.136, lines 1-3), that there was 
only one time when Jeremiah was taken into custody by the police. 
Respondents also assert that the natural mother only 
had limited contact with her son while he was on the reservation. 
(Resp. Br. at 3-4, No.5). Again, this is false. Cecelia testi-
fied that she saw Jeremiah almost everyday while he stayed with 
his grandmother pursuant to tribal custom, Transcript I, p.25, 
lines 14-16, and jjn addition used to have sole custody of him for 
several days every couple of weeks. Transcript I, p.25, line 4; 
p.26, lines 18-25. 
2 
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POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
OVER AN ADOPTION PROCEEDING INVOLVING 
JEREMIAH HALLOWAY. 
Respondents have attempted to completely mischaracter-
ize this case as an intrusion into "areas of traditional state 
interest." Resp. Br. at 14. Respondent's view of this 
proceeding, however, is wrong. Internal affairs of a tribe are 
historically the exclusive province of the tribe, and state 
authority is completely preempted absent express legislative 
permission by Congress. The Indian Child Welfare Act is express 
federal law designed to protect and even enhance tribal control 
over Indian children. Respondents1 argument that the ICWA is 
designed to grant jurisdiction to states is absurd and without 
merit. 
The principles governing resolution of jurisdictional 
disputes between Indian tribes and states were recently discussed 
at great length by the Supreme Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero 
Apache Tribe, 462 US 324, 76 L Ed 2d 611, 103 S Ct 2378 (1978). 
The Court noted at the beginning of its discussion the strong 
presumption of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over internal 
affairs, holding that 
in demarcating the respective spheres of state and 
tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have 
continued to stress that Indian tribes are unique 
aggregations possessing "attributes of sovereignty over 
both their members and their territory." (citation). 
Because of their sovereign status, tribes and their 
reservation lands are insulated in some respects by a 
(sic) "historic immunity from state and local control", 
3 
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Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US at 152, and 
tribes retain any aspect 5F tEeiFhistorical status not 
"inconsistent with the overriding interests of the 
National Government." (citations). 
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the 
power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions", (citations). A tribe's power to prescribe the 
conduct of tribal members has never been doubted, and 
our cases establish that "absent governing Acts of 
Congress", a State may not act in a manner that 
"infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them." (citations, 
including Fisher v^ District Court, 424 US 382, 388-89 
(1976) (adoption)). 
462 US at 332-33. 
The Supreme Court then discussed the ro le of "Indian 
preemption" in reso lv ing d isputes between s t a t e s and t r i b e s . 
After noting that preemption rules developed in regular constitu-
t i ona l cases are inappl icable when Indian a f f a i r s are involved 
because of "'the unique his tor ical origins of tr ibal sovereignty' 
and the federal commitment to tr ibal se l f - suf f ic iency and se l f -
determination," 462 US at 334, the Court enunciated the rule of 
Indian preemption: 
State j u r i s d i c t i o n i s preempted by the operation of 
federal law i f i t i n t e r f e r e s or i s incompatible with 
federal and tr ibal interests reflected in federal law, 
unless the s t a t e i n t e r e s t s at stake are s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y the a s s e r t i o n of s t a t e authori ty , ( c i t a t i o n s , 
including Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941) 
( s ta te authori ty precluded when i t "stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the fu l l purposes and 
objectives of Congress")). 
Certain broad considerations guide our assessment 
of the federal and t r i b a l i n t e r e s t s . The t r a d i t i o n a l 
n o t i o n s of Indian s o v e r e i g n t y prov ide a c r u c i a l 
"backdrop," (c i tat ions) , against which any assertion of 
s t a t e authori ty must be assessed . Moreover, both the 
tribes and the Federal Government are firmly committed 
to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal 
embodied in numerous federal statutes . . . . Thus when a 
4 
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tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority of 
federal law, an assertion of state authority must be 
viewed against interference with the successful accom-
plishment of the federal purpose, (citations). 
462 US at 334-36. 
The United States Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion 
has ruled that a state has no interest in an adoption proceeding 
involving an Indian child arising on the reservation. Fisher v. 
District Court, 424 US 382, 47 L Ed 2d 106, 96 S Ct 943 (1976). 
The Court concluded that: "State-court jurisdiction plainly 
would interfere with the powers of self-government conferred upon 
the (tribe) and exercised through the Tribal Court. It would 
subject a dispute arising on the reservation among reservation 
Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for 
themselves." 424 US at 387-88. The Court also found that there 
was no federal statute which sanctioned state interference with 
tribal self-government. Id. at 388. 
The fact that the Fisher case involved only Indians 
while in the present case the adoptive petitioners were non-
Indians is of no impact. As the Fisher decision noted, where the 
litigation "arise(s) out of conduct of an Indian reservation," 
even disputes between non-Indians and Indians are subject to 
exclusive tribal jurisdiction. 424 US at 386, citing Williams v. 
Lee, 358 US 217, 220, 3 L Ed 2d 251, 79 S Ct 269 (1959). All of 
the conduct in the present case before the adoption petition was 
filed took place on the Navajo reservation. The Fisher decision 
concluded that in an adoption proceeding, ""arising on the reser-
5 
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vation" is determined by the legal residence of the parties. The 
ICWA adopted this standard by basing jurisdiction on the domicile 
of the child. 25 USC Section 1911(a). 
With this preliminary discussion in mind, the ICWA 
itself must be looked at to discern its intent. Nothing in the 
ICWA evidences any intent to interfere with the well-settled 
rules of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over adoption proceedings 
involving Indian children discussed above. Section 1911(a) was 
included to expressly preserve this jurisdiction, and the legis-
lative history states that the section's intent is to confirm 
Federal and State law which holds that a tribe has exclusive 
jurisdiction over its children. House Report, supra, at 21. 
Congress recognized its duty to protect and preserve Indian 
tribes and their children, 25 USC Sections 1901(2), (3), and 
found that there was no greater threat to the integrity of tribal 
self-government than the loss of a tribe's children. I^ d. The 
express policy of the ICWA is to "[defer] to tribal judgment on 
matters concerning the custody of tribal children." BIA 
Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed Reg at 67585, Section A.l (Policy). 
Section 1911(a) takes up but a small part of the ICWA's 
space, but it is the most significant piece of the Act. The 
remainder of the Act covers only that small portion of Indian 
child custody proceedings where the State is exercising its 
"recognized" judicial and administrative jurisdiction over Indian 
child custody proceedings. 25 USC Section 1901(5). This recog-
nized jurisdiction, as discussed above, exists only where it has 
6 
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not been preempted by inherent tribal sovereignty or federal law. 
Then the Act goes further. Even where a state has valid juris-
diction over an Indian child, the ICWA intrudes significantly 
into this "traditional state area" by requiring the state court 
to follow federal standards rather than its own laws, 25 USC 
Section 1902, and even to give up its own recognized jurisdiction 
upon the request of the tribe unless good cause to the contrary 
exists. 25 USC Section 1911(b). See House Report, supra at 13-
16. To argue that the ICWA contemplates a loss of tribal juris-
diction in the face of such plain statutory language is patently 
absurd. 
The facts of the present case create precise legal 
implications under this analysis. Jurisdiction was clearly with 
the Navajo Nation under any theory of law up to the time Cecelia 
Saunders executed her consent to adoption before the tribal 
court. Jeremiah grew up on the reservation. Both the mother and 
grandmother have always resided and been domiciled on the reser-
vation. The Navajo tribal government was exerting voluntary 
jurisdiction over Jeremiah and his family by providing a variety 
of social services to them. 
It is undisputed that when Jeremiah was first removed 
from the reservation the mother thought it was for the purpose of 
foster placement only (Transcript I, p.53, lines 22-25). The 
aunt who removed Jeremiah, Polly Dick, concealed the fact that 
she had already made arrangements to place Jeremiah for adoption 
in a non-Indian home, (Transcript I, p.66, lines 17-19, and p.78, 
7 
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lines 7-16), and only broached the subject of adoption with 
Cecelia after Jeremiah had been placed for over a month 
(Transcript I, p.32, lines 6-8). The first formal evidence of 
any intent to consent to adoption took place at the consent 
proceeding of May 30, 1980 (Exhibit K). 
This point is important because it is this brief 
consent hearing, and the consent executed in front of the court 
at that time, which the trial court ruled effected a change of 
domicile from the Navajo Nation to the State of Utah. (gee 
Ruling of July 14, 1982). The ICWA requires that a voluntary 
consent must be executed before a judge to be effective when an 
Indian child is involved. 25 USC Section 1913(a). Yet what was 
the jurisdiction of the Fourth Judicial District Court to receive 
that consent? If, as the trial court held, the domicile of 
Jeremiah Halloway was changed when Cecelia Saunders executed her i 
consent where was his domicile immediately before? The answer is j 
obvious — it was on the reservation with his mother or grand-
mother. Yet if this was the case, how did the state court have I 
jurisdiction to hear her consent, when the case law and ICWA 
state without equivocation that a tribal court has exclusive I 
jurisdiction over such consents and all other aspects of adoption * 
proceedings involving Indian children. 25 USC Section 1911(a); 
Fisher v. District Court, supra; Wakefield y
-![ LittleLight, 347 A I 
2d 228 (Md. App. 1975). Indeed, the holding of Fisher is that an 
adult Indian cannot waive the exclusive jurisdiction of the I 
tribal court by leaving the reservation and invoking the juris- rj 
8 
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d i c t i o n of the s t a t e court. Fisher, supra, 424 US at 390-91; 
Wakefield v. L i t t l e L i g h t , 347 A 2d at 239 (party may not confer 
subject matter jurisdict ion by consent). If the attempted waiver 
of t r i b a l j u r i s d i c t i o n was void in Fisher where the l i t i g a n t s 
l e f t the reservat ion to invoke s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n , how can a 
different result be jus t i f i ed where the only off-reservation act 
was the execution of a consent to adoption? 
The t r i a l court committed error by bootstrapping i t s e l f 
into jurisdiction. The court should have determined the domicile 
of Jeremiah Halloway before i t took the consent of Cecel ia 
Saunders on May 30, 1980. The transcr ipt of that proceeding 
shows, however, that while the court made some general inquiries 
as to where the mother resided, i t never made a determination of 
domici le as required by the ICWA. Exhibit K, infra; 25 USC 
Section 1911(a); Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F 
Supp 719, 731 (D.W.D. Mich, N.D. 1973) ("the only r a t i o n a l 
approach i s to determine the domicile of the children at the time 
their physical custody was gained" by the state court). Instead 
i t assumed that i t had j u r i s d i c t i o n to rece ive the mother's 
consent, at which time i t took j u r i s d i c t i o n based on that 
consent. As was discussed in Appellants1 opening brief , a 
consent to adoption does not change the domicile of a minor (App. 
Br. at 34-35). This d i scuss ion shows that even under the t r i a l 
court's own reasoning, jurisdiction, over the present proceeding 
remained with the Navajo Nation. 
Where the Navajo Nation has undisputed j u r i s d i c t i o n 
9 
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over a minor child, and that jurisdiction is challenged (by the 
acts of the aunt in removing Jeremiah from the reservation, or 
the mother in consenting to adoption, or the state court in 
receiving the consent), the challenge must take place in the 
tribal court. "Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as 
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes 
affecting important personal and property interests of both 
Indians and non-Indians, [citations ]," Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, supra, 436 US at 65-66, and state court authority is 
completely preempted where these essential tribal interests arose 
on a reservation. The ICWA preserves this exclusive tribal 
authority, and wherever the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe 
is an issue, it is the tribal court which should first determine 
jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed this rule 
in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow TrJJje, 53 USLW 4649 
(June 3, 1985), where the Court concluded that i 
the existence and extent of a tribal court's juris-
diction will require a careful examination of tribal 
sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has J 
h o o n a H o r A ^ . H i v p s f p r i . nr H i m i n i R h p ^ . a s W P I 1 a s a I bee lte ed, d e ted, o  d i s ed,  well  
detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch 
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and 
administrative or judicial decisions. 
We believe that examination should be conducted in 
the first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our 
cases have often recognized that Congress is committed 
to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and 
self-determination. That policy favors a rule that 
will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being 
challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the 
factual and legal bases for the challenge. 
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In the present case the aunt who removed Jeremiah from 
the Navajo reservation testified that her intent was to avoid the 
involvement of the Navajo Nation in the placement of Jeremiah 
(Transcript I, p. 62, line 18 to p.63, line 17). The propriety 
of this action was never checked with the Navajo tribe to deter-
mine whether it was valid under Navajo law. In addition, by 
denying the tribal court the right to determine its jurisdiction 
first, the trial court wrongly divested the tribe of the right to 
apply its own cultural standards to Jeremiah. The tribe argued 
repeatedly throughout this case that under Navajo custom the 
maternal grandmother had a legal responsibility to care for 
Jeremiah, and that under Navajo custom a Navajo mother has no 
power to cut off the legal rights of extended family members by 
executing a consent to adoption. See Navajo Common Law of 
Adoption. App. Exhibit B. Yet the trial court completely 
ignored the constitutionally protected right of the Navajo Nation 
to the practice of its own culture, and applied alien legal 
standards in holding that under Utah law the mother has the power 
to cut off the rights of other family members. Whether the 
domicile of Jeremiah remained on the Navajo reservation under 
Navajo law, and whether the actions of the mother in consenting 
to the adoption of Jeremiah were sufficient under Navajo law to 
divest the tribe of its jurisdiction and the relatives of their 
right to custody was never addressed by the trial court. It was 
addressed by the Navajo court in its ruling of October 12, 1984, 
however, App. Exhibit H, where the tribal court ruled that the 
11 
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state court's ruling was completely contrary to the laws and 
public policy of the tribe. It is for this reason that the Utah 
Supreme Court should give full faith and credit to the ruling of 
the Navajo tribal court and reverse the decision of the state 
district court. 
Respondents1 brief contains no discussion in opposition 
to the settled rule that undefined terms in federal statutes are 
to be defined by the federal common law, because there is no 
contrary law. Instead they deliberately falsify the legislative 
history of the Act in an attempt to argue that the Act leaves the 
issue of domicile for state courts to decide according to state 
law. Res. Br. at 16. This falsification occurs when Respondents 
write that "many commentators recommend (sic) that the Act 
include a uniform definition of residence and domicile." Id. 
(emphasis added). These commentators were not referring to the 
Act, however, they were referring to the inclusion of a defini-
tion of domicile in guidelines issued over one year after the Act 
itself was passed. 44 Fed. Reg. at 67585. The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs commented on the meaning of domicile a£ the time the Act 
was passed and nowhere mentioned that state law would in any way 
control its definition. House Report, supra, at 31 (comment on 
section 101(a)). See State, ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. England, 
640 P2d 608, 613 (Or 1982) (definition of Indian custodian 
expressly refers to state law). 
Federal courts had already adopted the Restatement of 
Conflicts rule, a summary of existing state law, as the federal 
12 
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common law for the domicile of a minor in Ziady v^ Curley, supra. 
Creation of federal common law from state law requires that the 
state law be consistent with the purposes of the underlying 
federal statute, and the Bureau's certification that existing 
state law definitions of domicile were consistent with the 
purposes of the ICWA fulfills that requirement. 44 Fed. Reg. at 
67585. Nowhere, however, does this statement by the Bureau 
indicate that state law controls the outcome of domicile. 
The trial court did not follow existing law, however, 
in determining the domicile of Jeremiah Halloway; instead it 
created new law. Even the BIA Guidelines did not authorize such 
a tactic. The statement of the Bureau, issued in 1979, stated 
that state law existing at that time defined domicile in a manner 
consistent with the purposes of the ICWA. The trial court used 
the doctrine of in loco parentis to justify its ruling that the 
domicile of Jeremiah had unilaterally shifted from the Navajo 
reservation to Utah, Order of October 6, 1983, No. 4, but this 
doctrine does not apply to anyone except blood relatives. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, Section 22, comment i. 
Once again the Respondents are selective in their 
citation of relevant law in an attempt to obfuscate the truth. 
As Respondents quote the Restatement (Resp. Br. at 17), comment i 
(the in loco parentis doctrine) does say that the doctrine should 
apply to persons who are not blood relatives. But this is only a 
recommendation; it is not existing law. The sentence before 
this, which Respondents conveniently omit from their brief, 
13 
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states: "To date, the cases have placed the child's domicile, in 
the circumstances dealt with here, at the home of a grandparent 
or other close relative." (emphasis added). This statement is 
the existing law, and the ruling of the trial court on this point 
was clear error. 
In addition, before the adoption of new state law can 
be considered for purposes of the federal common law, such new 
law must comport with the underlying policies of the federal 
statute. E.g., Ziady v. Curley, supra. A cursory glance at the 
policies of the ICWA is clear evidence that the in loco parentis 
doctrine cannot be extended under the ICWA to non-Indian 
strangers. The Act is designed to keep Indian children with 
their families, to defer to tribal judgment on Indian child 
custody matters, and to place Indian children within their own 
culture. BIA Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67585, Section 
A.l (Policy). Any result contrary to these preferences is 
strongly disfavored. 1^ 3. at 67586. Yet what is the result if 
the new doctrine of in loco parentis created by the trial court 1 
is adopted? Removal of Jeremiah from the family with no oppor-
tunity to contest is upheld, the tribe is divested with no say 1 
from exercising any authority over its children, and the place- i 
ment of Jeremiah in a non-Indian home in violation of the place-
ment preferences is ratified. The trial court's ruling on this I 
issue therefore must be rejected. 
Only one case is cited by Respondents to justify this fl 
result, Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P2d 64 (Utah, 1978). This case 
14 
] 
I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
does not discuss the effect of the in loco parentis doctrine on 
the issue of domicile. Gribble concerned only the rights of a 
step-father as a parent under a specific Utah statute, UTAH CODE 
ANN. Section 30-3-5, where the father already had legal custody 
of the child under a court order. 583 P2d at 68. The Court also 
noted that a specific hearing would have to be conducted on 
whether the step-father should be granted any other in loco 
parentis rights beside a statutory right of visitation, Id. at 
68, and noted that in general a step-parent relationship 
conferred no legal rights at common law. Id. at 65. A case more 
on point is Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P2d 773 
(1958), where the Utah court ruled that domicile remained with 
the mother despite her initial attempt to abandon all parental 
rights. 
Respondents also cite another section of the Restate-
ment to justify their contention that the domicile of Jeremiah 
could shift away from the Navajo reservation, but this argument 
makes no sense. Resp. Br. at 18. Respondents argue that an 
"emancipated" child can acquire his own domicile upon being 
abandoned by the parents. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, 
Section 22, comment f. But emancipation only applies to children 
who have become "adults" and who no longer need the supervision 
of a parent. Respondents cannot seriously argue that a three 
year-old infant became emancipated in the present case. 
Respondent's recitation of several Utah cases on abandonment to 
justify this position is therefore completely irrelevant. See 
15 
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Restatement Section 22, comment e (domicile of an abandoned 
child) . 
The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Matter 
2l Appeal j.n Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P2d 18 7 
(Ariz App 1981), cert denied, 455 US 1007 (1982), is identical in 
its important facts to the present case. It should first be 
noted that the trial court attempted to diminish the impact of 
the Pima County case by altering the facts. Order of January 28, 
1985, pp. 6-7. The trial court states that the adoptive parents 
only had custody of the child for four months in Pima County, But 
the important issue here is abandonment, and the natural mother 
in Pima County had met the statutory requirement by giving up 
custody of her child for over six months. 635 P2d at 190. Thus 
in both cases the mother had "abandoned11 their child as required 
by state law. Both parents had executed a voluntary consent to 
adoption. Both parents had revoked their consents. In addition, 
the Pi.ma County case even had worse facts. The mother in that 
case was not living on the reservation. The adoptive parents 
were given legal custody of the child under a temporary custody 
order. The child was born off the reservation. Yet despite all 
these facts, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the 
domicile of the child remained with the mother on the reservation 
until legally changed by a valid court order. Id. at 191. It is 
this decision which should control the outcome of the present 
case. 
Respondents acknowledge the inadequacy of their own 
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case citations when they state that none of them were decided 
since the passage of the ICWA in 1978. Resp. Br. at 23. All of 
the cited cases have either been overruled by passage of the ICWA 
or are irrelevant to Respondents' argument. 
In £e Cantrell, 495 P2d 179 (Mont. 1972), and Matter o£ 
Duryea, 563 P2d 885 (Ariz, 1977) have both been overruled by 
passage of the ICWA. Both cases involved a state taking juris-
diction of an Indian child where the Indian parent remained 
domiciled on the reservation. Contrary to the assertions of 
Respondents, Resp. Br. at 23, neither of these cases based its 
assertion of state jurisdiction on a finding that the domicile of 
the child was off reservation. Both took jurisdiction because a 
portion of the child's conduct took place off reservation. See 
563 P2d at 886. This jurisdiction was based on state statutes, 
see A.R.S. Section 8-532, giving a state jurisdiction whenever a 
child is found within a state. Under the ICWA a child can be 
physically present off-reservation but still domiciled on reser-
vation, and the state court would be without jurisdiction over 
the child. 25 USC Section 1911(a). 
The Cantrell decision was expressly considered and 
rejected by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Wakefield v. 
LittleLight, supra (the Maryland court noted that in Cantrell, 
"At the time jurisdiction was assumed the child was apparently 
domiciled on the reservation," 347 A2d at 235. (emphasis added). 
The Wakefield decision concluded that state jurisdiction should 
be decided by the domicile of the child when the child first 
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appears before the court. ld^ at 238. The holding of the 
Wakefield case was expressly adopted by the Congress. See House 
Report, supra, at 21. 
The Duryea decision, 563 P2d 985, supra, has also been 
overruled. Its decision was based on the Cantrell decision, and 
is therefore no longer good law. It has also been overruled by 
the ICWA case of Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 
635 P2d 187, supra. In Duryea, jurisdiction was taken because 
"conduct of the parents in leaving the children...took place 
completely off the reservation." 563 P2d at 887. In the Pima 
county case all of the conduct of the mother took place off the 
reservation. Finding that the mother was domiciled on the reser-
vation, however, and the domicile of the child was the same as 
here, the court held that state jurisdiction was preempted. This 
decision overrules Duryea. 
The other cases cited by Respondents actually support 
Appellant's position that the domicile of Jeremiah remains on the 
reservation. In DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 US 425, 43 L Ed 
2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082, the Supreme Court found that the land where 
the mother lived was no longer part of the reservation. The 
mother and child were therefore not domiciled on the reservation 
and state jurisdiction was proper. 
Adoption of Doe, 555 P2d 906 (N.M.App. 1976), also 
involved a case where both the mother and child lived off the 
reservation. Id. at 916-917. Since the child was not domiciled 
on reservation, state jurisdiction was proper. Jurisdiction 
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where the mother is domiciled on the reservation is covered by 
Matter ot Adoption ot a Baby Child, 700 P2d 198 (N.M. App. 1985). 
Doe was also attacked by Congress because it held that a Navajo 
grandfather's right to custody under Navajo custom would not be 
recognized by state law, and that "New Mexico need not subordi-
nate its own policy to a conflicting Navajo custom." 555 P2d at 
913-914. In the ICWA Congress specifically defined "Indian 
custodian," 25 USC Section 1903(6), to give extended family 
members legal rights to custody. See House Report, supra, at 20 
("While such a custodian may not have rights under state law, 
they do have rights under Indian custom which this bill seeks to 
protect"). Doe is no longer good law. 
Respondents have cited no cases since passage of the 
ICWA because there is no law which supports their position. The 
decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Matter of Appeal in 
Pima County Juvenile Action, supra, 635 P2d 187, and the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals in Matter of Adoption of a Baby Child, 
supra, 700 P2d 198, control the present case. Both cases held 
that the domicile of an Indian child remains that of the mother 
until a decree of adoption is granted. The decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Application of Morse, supra, 7 Utah 2J 312, 324 
P2d 773, is entirely in accord with these cases. The Court 
should find that the District Court was without jurisdiction over 
Jeremiah Hallway in the present proceeding. 
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POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT TERMINATING 
THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL MOTHER WITHOUT A 
FINDING OF UNFITNESS, AND GRANTING A 
DECREE OF ADOPTION, WAS IN ERROR, 
The Navajo Nation argued in its opening brief to this 
Court that the Indian Child Welfare requires a finding of unfit-
ness on the part of the parent before parental rights can be 
terminated. Respondents1 brief in response is the most eloquent 
argument possible that the Navajo Nation is correct on this 
point. Out of a 15 page discussion on the standard for termina-
tion (Resp. Br. pp. 34-49), one page (Resp. Br., p.46) is spent 
on circumstantial and irrelevant evidence of fitness. Respon-
dents spend one sentence (Resp. Br. p. 35) on their argument that 
the ICWA does not require a showing of unfitness before parental 
rights can be terminated. No statutory authority or legislative 
history is cited. No case law is cited because all of the ICWA 
case law is completely opposed to Respondents1 argument. E.g., 
Matter of Appeal in Pi.ni a County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 6 35 
P2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981), cert, denied, 455 US 1007 (1982). 
Apparently, Respondents' argument is to be accepted on faith 
alone. 
Respondents concentrate instead on two arguments: 1. 
that termination is justified because Jeremiah is so bonded to 
his present custodians that removal in and of itself will cause 
him emotional harm; and 2. that the natural mother, Cecelia 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Saunders, abandoned Jeremiah under Utah law. Both of these 
arguments are irrelevant, however, to the present proceeding. 
The ICWA does not permit abandonment as a justification for 
termination of parental rights, and conflicting Utah law is 
therefore preempted. Termination based solely on the condition 
of the child, without finding any unfitness on the part of the 
parent, violates the U.S. Constitution, the ICWA, Utah law, and 
Navajo law. 
The ICWA establishes one standard for termination of 
parental rights, a finding "that the continued custody of the 
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 USC 
Section 1912(f). This standards preempts all conflicting state 
law regarding termination. E.g. House Report No. 1386, 95th 
Cong, 2d Sess. 19 (1978), reprinted at 1978 U.S. CODE, CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 7541 ("While the committee does not feel that it is 
necessary or desirable to oust the States of their traditional 
jurisdiction...it does feel the need to establish minimum Federal 
standards and procedural safeguards in State Indian child custody 
proceedings...."). See 25 USC Section 1921. 
The ICWA standard requires a showing that the parent is 
unfit. See Matter of Appeal in Pima County, supra, 635 P2d at 
192 ("the issue in these termination proceedings is...the 
unfitness of the parent"), and as such is identical to the 
requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-38-48(a). This section 
requires a finding "That the parent or parents are unfit or 
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incompetent by reason of conduct or condition which is seriously 
detrimental to the child...." (emphasis added). A quick glance 
at the ICWA shows that the same showing is required under its 
terms. The Act requires that: "The evidence must show the 
causal relationship between the conditions that exist (in the 
home) and the damage that is likely to result," BIA Guidelines, 
supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593 (Section 0.3(c)), and proof showing 
that it is "likely that the conduct of the parents will result in 
serious physical or emotional harm to the child." BIA Guidelines, 
supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593 (Section D.4 Commentary). 
Because the standard under the ICWA and Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-38-48(a) are identical, Appellants in their opening 
brief discussed the holdings of several recent Utah cases which 
addressed termination under this fitness standard. Ijn £e J.P., 
648 P2d 1364 (Utah 1982); Interest o£ Walter B^, 577 P2d 119 
(Utah, 1978); State, In Interest of E.V.J.T., 578 P2d 831 (Utah, 
1978); State v^ Lance, 464 P2d 395 (Utah, 1970). These cases 
also discussed abandonment as a separate issue, but abandonment 
is not the issue in the present case and Respondents1 concentra-
tion on abandonment is merely a smokescreen to divert attention 
way from the Court's discussion of fitness. These cases make 
clear that the grounds for termination in the present case — the 
bonding of the child to substitute custodians and the damage that 
will be caused by separation from those custodians — are wholly 
improper without a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
parent was unfit. State, In Interest of E.v.J.T., supra, 578 P2d 
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at 834. This is the relevant point of Utah law for the present 
case. 
The argument of abandonment raised by Respondents is 
therefore completely irrelevant to the present proceeding. The 
fact that the Utah Code has a separate section for abandonment, 
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-38-48(b), shows that fitness and aban-
donment are different standards. See In re J.P., supra, 648 P2d 
at 1367 (unfitness 0£ abandonment). The ICWA contains no 
language or legislative history giving any indication that aban-
donment is an acceptable ground for termination of parental 
rights. See Matter o£ Appeal in Pima County, supra, 635 P2d at 
190 (reversal of trial court ruling that mother "abandoned" the 
child). Indeed the express language of the ICWA preempts and 
excludes any termination standard of abandonment, because a 
parent has the right to revoke a voluntary consent "for any 
reason at. any time prior to the entry of a final decree of 
termination or adoption...and the child shall be returned to the 
parent"). 25 USC Section 1913(c) (emphasis added). Congress 
could have placed a six month limit on the right to revoke 
consent; they did not. If parental rights can be terminated 
under the ICWA after six months of abandonment, Section 1913(c) 
would be stripped of any meaning. 
Respondents rely heavily on abandonment in their brief 
("inasmuch as abandonment...has been proven to the trial court, 
there was absolutely no need to establish a separate basis of 
"unfitness" of the natural mother," Resp. Br. at 37), because 
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there was no other evidence to justify the trial courts1 termina-
tion order. There was not sufficient evidence that the mother 
was unfit, and therefore the success of Respondents must succeed 
or fail solely on a finding that abandonment by itself is 
sufficient under the ICWA. The trial court itself could only 
find that there was "some testimony regarding the fitness" of the 
parents, Decision of January 28, 1985, p.5, but even that 
evidence was four years old. 
The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Matter 
of Appeal in Pima county Juvenile Action, supra is directly on 
point again regarding the standard for termination of parental 
rights. The trial court recognized the holding of the Pima 
County which concluded that an Indian mother has an absolute 
right to revoke her consent to adoption and "is entitled to the 
return of her child jLn t:he absence of[ evidence of he£ 
fitness...." Decision of January 28, 1985, p.6; see 635 P2d at 
193. The trial court then attempted to distinguish the Pima 
County case based on the length of time the Indian child had been 
with the adoptive parents, finding that in Pima County it had 
only been four months, less than the six months required to meet 
the state standard for abandonment. But abandonment is calcu-
lated on the length of t^me the child has been abandoned by the 
natural parents, not the length of JtjLme the child has been with 
new parents. In Pima County the mother relinquished her parental 
rights on March 18, 1980. 635 P2d at 189. She requested the 
return of her child on September 29, 1980, Id., more than six 
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months after she first relinquished her rights. She therefore 
met the Arizona state standard for abandonment. Yet the Pima 
County Court found that abandonment under state law was complete-
ly irrelevant under the ICWA, which required a showing of unfit-
ness before return of the child could be avoided. 635 P2d at 
193. There is no legal difference between this case and the 
present appeal. Basing termination solely on the bonding and 
"best interests" of the child, as was done in the present case, 
has been soundly rejected by this Court. State, In Interest of 
E.v.J.T., supra. The trial court's attempt to distinguish and 
"belittle" the Pima County decision, therefore, is incorrect. 
An analysis of the findings of the trial court shows 
that there was no evidence of present unfitness and certainly not 
"evidence beyond a reasonable doubt", 25 USC Section 1912(f), 
that Cecelia Saunders was unfit. In j[n £e J.P., supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly required present conduct to justify 
termination of parental rights. 648 P2d at 1377. See 
Appellants' Opening Brief at 45-46. 
The findings of the trial court regarding fitness can 
be divided into several groups. The first is the adoption of 
dicta from a South Dakota case that the conduct of other persons 
besides the parents can be used to support a finding of termina-
tion. Matter o£ J.L.H., 316 NW2d 350 (S.D. 1982); Decision of 
Jan. 28, 1985, pp. 5-6. This is an incorrect standard. The ICWA 
refers only to the conduct of the parent in finding grounds for 
termination, 25 USC Section 1912(f). The extension of the Act 
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adopted by the trial court in the present case is not justified 
by the Act itself or by any principles of statutory construction. 
See BIA Guidelines, lugira, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593, Section 
D.3.(c). The ICWA is designed to protect the rights of Indian 
parents to their children, not to make it easier to break the 
Indian family up as the trial court attempted to do. 25 USC 
Section 1921. 
The J.L.H. case also does not say what the trial court 
claims it says — that the character of other people in the 
community may be grounds in and of itself for terminating 
parental rights. The J.L.H. decision at 316 NW2d 350 is actually 
the second opinion of the South Dakota Supreme Court in that 
case; the first opinion appears at 299 NW2d 812 (S.D. 1980), and 
explains the factual background behind the second opinion. The 
court noted that the mother held drinking parties at her home and 
did not exclude intoxicated people from the house. 299 NW2d at 
814. It was the failure of the mother to control the conduct of 
such other persons iji her own house which was the basis for 
terminating her parental rights. The evidence showed the 
unfitness of that mother. In the present case the trial court's 
finding that parental rights can be terminated based on the 
conduct of other persons living in the same community oversteps 
constitutional grounds in the power of a court to pass judgment 
on the legitimacy of another culture and lifestyle. See In 
Interest o£ J.R.H., 358 NW2d 311, 321-22 (Iowa 1984) (cultural 
and socio-economic conditions on a reservation inappropriate 
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grounds to remove an Indian child). 
The trial courtfs reliance on the grandmother's 
alcoholism (no finding was made that the alcoholism had caused 
damage to Jeremiah) to justify terminating Cecelia Saunders' 
parental rights is ironic, given the total rejection the trial 
court gave to any legal rights the grandmother might have to the 
custody of Jeremiah under tribal or federal law. Jeremiah lived 
with the grandmother for two and one-half years before he was 
removed from her house by a maternal aunt who lived off-
reservation. She had a legal right to Jeremiah's custody under 
the ICWA (see definition of "Indian custodian", 25 USC Section 
1903(6)) and under tribal custom (See Navajo Common Law of 
Adoption, Exhibit B to Appellants' Opening Brief), which could 
not be cut off by the actions of the mother in executing a 
consent to adoption. Jeremiah's domicile was the same as hers on 
the Navajo reservation. Yet the trial court never even mentioned 
the rights of the grandmother, and granted the adoption of 
Jeremiah without terminating her custodial rights. How is it 
that she has no rights to the custody of a child stolen out of 
her home without her consent, yet later her alleged conduct 
becomes the primary grounds for terminating the custodial rights 
of a completely different person? Looked at in this light it 
appears that the grandmother was given a "legal" interest to 
affect the future custody of her grandson only when it was 
convenient for the trial court to do so. The grandmother has 
always resided and been domiciled on the Navajo reservation. 
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Under these circumstances, what gives Utah the right to decide 
whether she has a legal interest in her grandson under Navajo 
custom? What gives a non-Indian state court the right to decide 
whether her lifestyle and conduct, performed completely outside 
the State of Utah, is proper? As an internal social relation of 
the Navajo Nation, any examination on these issues is solely the 
province of the Navajo courts. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
supra, 436 US at 65-66. 
Other evidence allegedly supporting the "unfitness" of 
the mother consists of a statement that the stepfather did not 
like Jeremiah and did not want him in the family relationship. 
Decision of January 28, 1985, p.6. This statement concerned the 
attitude of the father before Jeremiah was removed from the 
reservation five years ago. There is no evidence more recent to 
justify its finding. The present evidence is uncontroverted that 
both the stepfather and mother desire very deeply the return of 
Jeremiah and that they are fit custodians. Transcript II, pp. 
237-230. (Testimony of Dr. Roll). Yet the trial court does not 
even mention this evidence. This failure is clear error. 
The trial court also attempted to characterize the 
events surrounding the mother's consent to adoption and subse-
quent revocation of that consent as evidence of unfitness. It 
should be noted that this evidence is irrelevant since the mother 
has expressed her present intent to obtain the return of her son, 
is raising three other children of her own with no problems, and 
she and the step-father are presently fit and proper parents. 
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Aside from this, however, the court's characterization of events 
is incorrect and reflects a fundamental misperception of Navajo 
life and culture. 
The trial court concluded that the mother willingly 
gave the child up for adoption. The mother testified, however, 
that she wished she had not had to have Jeremiah adopted but felt 
she had no other options at the time (Transcript II, p.302, lines 
17-22). The Indian Child Welfare Act was not explained to the 
mother when she consented to the adoption of Jeremiah before the 
trial court in 1980. Respondents dispute this contention, Resp. 
Br., p.12, line 12, but Respondents are wrong. A copy of the 
complete transcript of the May 30, 1980 consent proceeding is 
attached to this brief as Exhibit K; the ICWA is never mentioned 
in that proceeding to the mother. In addition, the mother was 
not appointed independent legal counsel to advise her of the ICWA 
as required by the Act, 25 USC 1912(b) (right to counsel in any 
placement proceeding); .In rje M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 
(Mont, 1981). Independent legal advice was one of Congress' 
prime concerns in enacting the ICWA. House Report, supra, at 11. 
Another aspect of the consent proceeding must be 
brought up at this point. Nowhere in this entire proceeding did 
the trial court ever satisfy itself of the mother's understanding 
of English. The facts show that the mother did not fully under-
stand English. For example, the mother's answers in the consent 
proceeding were rarely more than one syllable. Respondents them-
selves testified that when Jeremiah first appeared at their 
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house, he spoke no English at all. Transcript I, p.76, lines 13-
22). 
The most important example of the mother's comprehen-
sion of English involves the revocation of her consent to 
adoption. The trial court found (without citing any evidence) 
that the mother revoked her consent only after the tribe 
disapproved of the adoption and put pressure on her. Decision of 
January 28, 1985, p.6. There is another explanation, however, 
which requires some consideration and understanding of Navajo 
culture. At the hearing of April 7, 1983, a Navajo social worker 
testified that she tried to explain the ICWA to the mother in 
English, but that the mother did not understand her. Transcript 
I, p.121, lines 1-9). A social worker who spoke Navajo came and 
explained the ICWA to her in Navajo. Id. Immediately after 
this explanation, the mother, who understood her rights for the 
first time in two years, asked for her son back. Id. 
Cecelia initially concealed the fact that she had 
consented to the adoption of Jeremiah. Cecelia told the worker 
that Jeremiah was on LDS foster placement. When Cecelia was 
finally confronted with evidence that she had consented to 
termination of her parental rights, she became upset. The trial 
court and Respondents twisted this statement into a conclusion 
that Cecelia was "disgruntled" because she really wanted the 
adoption to go through. Resp. Br. at 2, line 8. There is no 
independent evidence to support this conclusion, however, and an 
alternative explanation is likely if aspects of Navajo culture 
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are given even minimal consideration. Children are the most 
important aspect of Navajo society. See Navajo Common Law of 
Adoption, Appellants1 Exhibit B., p. A-3 ("Child Abuse and 
Neglect - A Navajo Perspective"). Under Navajo tradition, the 
loss of one's child is the worst thing that can happen, and 
subjects the parent to societal embarrassment and even possible 
ostracism from the community. When Cecelia was confronted with 
the fact that she had given up her son, was she upset because she 
really wanted to give him up or was she upset because she knew 
that knowledge of her actions would subject her to severe 
embarrassment within the Navajo community. The Utah trial court 
came to its own conclusion of these events; the Navajo Nation 
suggests that if these facts had been presented to a tribal court 
or at least a trier of fact with some understanding of Navajo 
culture, there may have been a different result. 
Finally, we address the trial court's finding that 
there was "testimony, although not uncontroverted, that the 
mother revoked her consent only after being subject to duress by 
the Navajo Nation." Decision of January 28, 1985. A short 
review of the actual facts shows that the trial court's finding 
violates all known standards of evidence, and that there was not 
even a scintilla of reliable evidence to support the trial 
court's finding on this point. The cited transcript pages turn 
out to be the testimony of Polly Dick, the maternal aunt who 
removed Jeremiah to begin with from the Navajo reservation for 
adoptive placement in Utah. What was her "proof" of duress? 
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Several sisters told her that tribal workers were harrassing 
Cecelia. Transcript I, p.61, lines 12-17. So we are immediately 
presented with the fact that this testimony is second or third-
hand hearsay, with no reliability. Polly testified that she 
hardly ever visited the reservation and had no first-hand 
information about the allegations. Id. at p.66, line 25 to p.67, 
line 4. 
In addition, Pollyfs testimony was shown to have no 
reliability. Polly testified that when she first removed 
Jeremiah to Utah, she intended to raise him herself. Transcript 
I, p.64, lines 20-25. Immediately following her testimony Dan 
Carter, the adoptive father, who had listened in the courtroom to 
Polly testify, took the stand. He was asked whether Polly's 
version of events was true and stated that jjt was not true, that 
Polly had arranged to place Jeremiah for adoption with him over a 
month before she removed him from the reservation! Id. at p.70, 
lines 10-25. Not only is Polly's testimony hearsay, but Polly 
created testimony to suit her own purposes whenever she thought 
it was convenient. 
The mother's testimony on the other hand was first-
hand. Subjected to repeated questions by counsel for Respondents 
in an attempt to be "as clear as possible", she stated four times 
when asked whether she had been forced to revoke her consent by 
the tribe with a simple and eloquent "no". Transcript I, p. 36, 
line 15, to p.37, line 9. In light of Cecelia's direct testimony 
and the fact that the opposing evidence consisted only of second 
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or third-hand hearsay which was likely made up, the finding of 
the trial court that the tribe subjected the mother to duress is 
completely without merit and should be reversed. 
The previous discussion has shown that the ICWA 
requires a finding of unfitness before parental rights can be 
terminated, and that there was no evidence presented to the trial 
court that the parents were presently unfit. Under such circum-
stances, the ruling of the trial court to terminate the parental 
rights of Cecelia Saunders was in error, and must be reversed. 
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POINT III 
RELIANCE ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PROPERLY 
OBJECTED TO, IN MEETING THE BURDEN OF SHOWING ACTIVE 
REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS AND THE UNFITNESS OF THE 
NATURAL MOTHER, IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Respondents1 arguments on the fitness of Cecelia 
Saunders as a parent and on the evidence "proving" that active 
remedial and rehabilitative efforts had been attempted with 
Cecelia and had proven unsuccessful are completely dependent on 
Navajo social work records which were admitted into the trial 
court record, and later made part of the evidence, over the 
objection of the tribe. For example, Respondents state: "The 
most important illustration of the failure of any type of reha-
bilitation of the natural mother and her family comes from the 
notes of the social agencies working with the family." (Resp. 
Br. at 27). These notes, however, were hearsay testimony which 
were inadmissable in the trial court proceeding. A short 
chronology is necessary first before showing that the trial 
court's admission into evidence of these records and its reliance 
on these records for termination was clear error. 
A social worker for the Navajo nation, Lauren Bernally, 
testified at the hearing on April 7, 1983, and stated that she 
had referred to caseworker notes in preparing her testimony. 
Counsel for Respondents was permitted to examine the records and 
to use them in his cross-examination. At the end of the hearing 
the court made the caseworker notes "part of the record since 
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extensive referrals was (sic) made reference to this file and if 
an appellate court has to review this matter, then I think it 
would be well that they have the contents of that file as well.H 
Transcript I, at 168. There was no attempt by Respondents at any 
time during the hearing to formally move the notes into evidence. 
It is axiomatic that documents which are part of a trial court 
record are not necessarily admissable evidence. 
Counsel for Respondents, however, began referring to 
the notes as "admitted evidence11 soon thereafter. The Navajo 
Nation immediately objected to this characterization. See, 
Letter of April 27, 1983, from Craig Dorsay to Honorable David 
Sam; Letter of May 4, 1983, from Richard Johnson to Honorable 
David Sam; Letter of August 8, 1983, from Craig Dorsay to 
Honorable David Sam. The issue remained unresolved until the 
termination hearing on October 22, 1984. The Navajo Nation again 
objected to Respondents use of hearsay testimony within the 
caseworker's notes as admissable evidence. Transcript II, pp.73, 
75. The District Court overruled the objection of the Navajo 
Nation. Transcript II, p.76. 
This ruling was incorrect, and is reversible error. It 
is a violation of Rule 805 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
involving hearsay within hearsay. See McCormick on Evidence (3rd 
ed., 1984), Section 324.3. While the caseworker notes might 
qualify in appropriate situations (where a proper foundation is 
laid) under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, 
Rule 803(6), this does not make all statements within those notes 
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admissable evidence. Admissable evidence within those notes is 
limited to statements which are the first-hand observations of 
the maker of the statements. All other hearsay opinions, 
recordations of hearsay statements of other parties, and other 
hearsay statements are not admissable unless they fall within 
some other independent exception to the hearsay rule. The 
District Court violated this rule in admitting and using the 
caseworker notes. 
Other courts have easily found that such a ruling is 
reversible error. A New York decision for example, Matter of 
Leon RR, 397 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. App. 1979), is directly on point. 
In that case the state offered the entire caseworker file into 
evidence. The parents objected, arguing that admission of the 
materials "en masse" would be severely prejudicial because they 
could contain damaging hearsay. Id. at 377. The trial court 
rejected this argument. The Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court's ruling was reversible error because of the improper 
effect hearsay evidence could have on the trier of fact, 
concluding: "These considerations are pointedly illustrated by 
this case in which the courts below placed strong reliance upon 
hearsay evidence to terminate respondents' parental rights. 
(emphasis added)." 397 N.E. 2d at 377-78. The court discussed 
the requirements for the admission of each statement in a 
caseworker's notes, finding that each statement in the records 
must be qualified independently as admissable evidence. The mere 
fact that the recording of statements by third parties may be a 
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routine practice of the caseworker does not make these statements 
reliable and "imports no guarantee of the truth...." Id. at 178. 
The court concluded that third party statements contained in 
caseworker notes are inadmissable for the truth of the matter 
asserted: "[T]o construe those statements as admissable simply 
because the caseworker is under a business duty to record would 
be to open the floodgates for the introduction of random, 
irresponsible material beyond the usual test of accuracy - cross 
examination and impeachment of the declarant." Id. 
The trial court fulfilled the worst nightmares of the 
New York Court of Appeals in the present case. One example will 
suffice to show the effect of the trial court's erroneous 
decision. On page 27 of Respondents' brief, Respondents quote 
the results of a meeting with two psychiatrists, in which the 
tribal social worker wrote down a summary of their comments. 
Respondents attempt to use these statements of third parties who 
were not in the courtroom in Provo to testify or be cross-
examined for the truth of the statement asserted. Indeed Respon-
dents have classified these hearsay declarations as their "most 
important" evidence supporting the failure of remedial and reha-
bilitative services. 
A cursory examination of the actual statements shows 
how an out-of-court statement can be twisted and distorted by an 
overzealous advocate if the rules of evidence are ignored. The 
caseworker reported that the two psychiatrists were "reluctant to 
testify in court of the stability of the Saunders family" because 
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it would be unfair to testify on behalf of the family and not be 
able to express what may be developed later." (R. 122-123). 
Respondents now assert that this proves that Cecelia's family was 
unstable. In actuality, the psychiatrists thought Cecelia was a 
fit parent. A letter from one of the psychiatrists who is the 
subject of this entry, M.E. Mueller, is attached to Appellants' 
Opening Brief as Exhibit A. Dr. Mueller states: "I have inter-
viewed Cecelia Saunders, and can find no indication from our 
interview that she might have a mental disorder that would make 
her incapable of caring for a child." He cannot, however, 
testify as to whether Cecelia would be a better parent than 
Respondents. The truth therefore is quite different than the 
false picture painted by Respondents of the doctors' statements, 
based on inadmissible hearsay. 
None of the three "expert" witnesses presented by the 
Respondents testified on the fitness of the natural mother, or 
questioned the care of her other three children. Instead the 
Respondents relied on a hearsay declaration, recorded by a tribal 
caseworker, for the truth of an erroneous conclusion. The 
admission of this statement, which was the main support for the 
court's conclusion that 25 USC Section 1912(d) had been complied 
with, was error. Because of this erroneous ruling, the burden of 
disproving the notes' characterization was erroneously put on the 
tribe. See In re Appeal in Maricopa Juv. Action No. J-75482, 536 
P2d 197, 202 (Ariz. 1975) ("By considering the report over the 
objection of appellant, the trial court shifted the burden to 
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appellant to attack the material in the report in much the same 
fashion as in a civil trial.") If Respondents in the present 
case wanted to prove that two psychiatrists found that Cecelia 
Saunders was unstable, they should have subpoened the psychia-
trists to testify. 
The caseworker herself was at the trial. She testified 
that Cecelia and Arthur Saunders were fit parents (Transcript I, 
p.122 lines 2-3), and that they required no remedial and reha-
bilitative services to become fit parents (Transcript I, p. 124, 
lines 12-23). The trial court did not even mention the existence 
of this first-hand testimony, however, and chose to rely instead 
solely on declarations in the caseworker notes which supported 
its conclusion to terminate parental rights. This failure is 
clear error. 
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POINT IV 
NO REMEDIAL OR REHABILITATIVE SERVICES HAVE BEEN 
PROVIDED TO THE NATURAL MOTHER AS REQUIRED BY 
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT. 
One case has changed since submission of Appellants1 
opening brief. A decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals, Matter 
of Charles, 688 P2d 1354 (Or.App. 1984), has now been finalized. 
The Oregon Supreme Court denied review of the decision. The 
discussion and holding of the Court of appeals on the subject of 
remedial and rehabilitative services is quite useful in analyzing 
the testimony which the trial court held satisfies its burden 
under 25 USC Section 1912(d): 
The language of the provision is unequivocal: The 
state "shall satisfy the court that active efforts have 
been made to provide remedial services." (Emphasis in 
original). To do that, the state must show that the 
efforts have been made but have not worked. In the 
present case, the state did not make an explicit 
showing, but it points to testimony peppered throughout 
the hearing that indicates that some remedial efforts 
were made which were arguably unsuccessful and asks us 
to find on de novo review that the showing required by 
Section 1912(d) was made. We cannot conclude that the 
diffuse evidence to which the state points amounts to 
the affirmative showing that Congress contemplated when 
it enacted Section 1912(d). 
688 P2d at 1359. 
Respondents repeat the d i s c u s s i o n of the t r i a l cour t 
a l l e g i n g t h a t a Navajo s o c i a l worker t e s t i f i e d t h a t the t r i b e 
stopped working with the natural mother. Resp. Br. at 26. This 
a l l e g a t i o n i s f a l s e . The worker was c r o s s - e x a m i n e d by 
Respondents on whether she had enough f i r s t hand information on 
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this case to testify, and admitted that she did not. Transcript 
I, p. 107-108. She testified only as an expert on Navajo policy, 
and stated that the Navajo tribe does not permit the adoption of 
tribal children by non-Indians. See Transcript I, p. 109, lines 
6-7, p.124, lines 1-11. Her testimony had absolutely nothing to 
do with whether the tribe actually provided remedial services to 
the natural mother. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the decision of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court should be reversed and Jeremiah 
Halloway should be returned to the jurisdiction of the Navajo 
Nation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /[ day of December, 
1985. 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Craig J. Dorsay 
of Attorneys for Appellants 
42 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if: 
N THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THL ADOPTION 
OF: JEREMIAH HALLOWAY 
A Minor, 
Probate No. 19,981 
CONSENT TRANSCRIPT 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of May, 1980, 
the CONSENT was taken by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State 
of Utah, before the Honorable David Sam at the Utah County 
Courthouse, Provo, Utah, 84601. 
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For the P e t i t i o n e r s 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
Mr. Richard Maxfield 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 84601 
P R 0 C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Alright, this is in the Matter 
of the Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway, Probate No. 19,981. 
Alright, counsel you may proceed. 
CECELIA DICK 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the petitioners, beingj 
first duly sworn was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAXF1ELD: 
Q Would you state your name please? 
A Cecelia Dick. 
Q And Cecelia you are the mother of Jeremiah Halloway 
i s that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And he was born to you out of wedlock on the 14th 
day of March, 1977? 
A No May. 
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Q O h , e x c u s e me M a y 1 7 t h ? 
A Y e s . 
Q 1 9 7 7 . 
A Y e s . 
Q At Gallup, New Mexico. 
A Yes. 
Q And you do not know who the father is is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Cecelia you have placed him with a couple 
here in Utah County Dan Lewis Carter and Patricia Carter 
and he has been living with them since March of this year is 
that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And is it your desire to have them adopt him and 
treat him as if he were their own child? 
A Yes. 
Q And you understand by doing this you are giving up 
all rights to him you can not come back and change your mind 
and claim him? 
A Yes. 
Q And I have discussed this fully with you and explaine! 
to you the circumstances is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Now Cecelia have you been promised or paid anything fcj 
doing this ? 



























Q And what was that?
 t 
A Money t ha t I came up on. 
Q They agreed to pay you $50.00 to have you come so tha| 
you could s ign t h i s is t ha t r i g h t fo r gas and o i l? 
A Yes. 
Q And I am to pay you after this so that you but 
anything else has there been any other money? 
A No. 
Q And they are not going to pay you anything else? 
A No. 
Q And this money here was only to pay the, for the 
gas and oil for coming here so you could sign this consent 
is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And any other promise or anything else have been givj 
to you for doing this? 
A No. 
Q Now Cecelia you have read this consent before and 
you are willing to sign this consent at this time wherein 
you agree to all these things in writing? 
A Yes. 
MR. MAXFIELD: Your Honor do you have any 
questions? 
THE COURT: Yes, I would like Cecelia to know what 
4 
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i s your n a t i o n a l i t y , what you are Ind ian is tha t r i g h t ? 
A Yes. 
Q And what tribe are you from? 
A Navajo. 
Q Where was your home was it in New Mexico or Arizona? 
A New Mexico. 
Q And are you a member of the tribe there in New 
Mex ico? 
A Yes. 
Q And are you full blooded Navajo? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay, well, let's have her sign the document counsel 
(WHEREUPON, Cecelia Dick signs the consent to adoption) 
MR. MAXFIELD:And would you put the 30th right 
there.(ind) Today is the 30th of May. Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay, Cecelia thank you yery much. 
(WHEREUPON, the consent proceedings was concluded) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Reply 
Brief of Appellants on the following attorney: 
Richard B. Johnson Attorney for Respondents 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
VVM/U' 
by mailing twtb certified copies thereof, first class mail, 
contained in a sealed envelope with postage paid thereon, 
addressed to said attorney at the address shown above and 
deposited the same in the post office at Salt Lake City, Utah on 
December j7 , 1985, 
DATED this ' day of December, 1985. 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
of Attorneys for Appellants 
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